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THE ETHICS OF PHYSICIAN UNIONIZATION:
WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF YOUR DOCTOR
BECOMES A TEAMSTER?
Monique A. Anawis*

INTRODUCTION
At first consideration, the tenants of collective bargaining via
unionization appear to be directly opposed to the ethics of physicians as
healers in our society.
Physicians as professionals have ethical
obligations to first "do no harm," and further, to attend to the interests
of their patients before any personal interests. Unions, by definition,
are created to safeguard the interests of employees and seek improved
working conditions and benefits for their members. These potentially
conflicting goals raise several questions: Will unionization of
physicians work to the detriment of patients? Will the professional
identity of physicians need to fundamentally change with unionization?
Are physician unions ultimately doomed to failure because medical
ethics are incompatible with unions or will a new modified form of
unionization emerge?
This article will review the traditional concepts of collective
bargaining in the United States including the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) and anti-trust legislation in the medical setting. Evolving
legislation and case law will be discussed in the context of the ethical
considerations of patient care.

Monique A. Anawis is a surgeon and professor of Ophthalmology and
an attorney
concentrating in Health Law and Medical Malpractice. She holds M.D. and B.A. degrees from
Brown University, and a J.D. degree with a Certificate in Health Law from DePaul University
College of Law. The author wishes to express gratitude to Mark K. Borsody, M.D., Ph.D for
his review of this article.
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WHY WOULD PHYSICIANS WANT TO UNIONIZE?
Picture spending your most productive and vital years, ages eighteen
through your thirties, studying all hours of the day and night and all too
frequently finding yourself caring for strangers who may be less than
grateful by nature, circumstance, or illegal substances. As a physicianin-training, one spends many years in self-sacrifice while learning skills
for the greater goal of serving society. Next, picture that at the end of
this long tunnel of delayed personal gratification, the future is filled
with 100,000 or more dollars of debt to be repaid over the ensuing
decades in which you may hope to start a family and provide for them.
While this financial scenario is familiar to most individuals who pursue
graduate education in law, business or the sciences, physicians are very
different. The autonomy and ability of physicians to practice their
skills are now severely impeded if not frankly curtailed by financially
constrained hospitals, profit-seeking managed care and increasingly
invasive government policing. Of all physicians in the United States,
43.6% are employees of hospitals, universities, government or managed
care organizations.I Up to 90% of all physicians who complete their
medical training today will be employees instead of working for
themselves. 2 This historical evolution of medicine coupled with the
financial and personal pressures of being a physician has urged many
physicians to raise their lone, seemingly impotent voices in a powerful
coalition: a union.
Unions exist to protect employees from oppressive employers and
substandard working conditions. The voice of a single employee does
not have the impact to make change that hundreds or thousands of
employees joined in a coalition with a representative voice and the
power to strike have. A union's purpose is to safeguard employees'
rights. By contrast, businesses aim to make money. The result is that
employees and bosses have opposing goals that may become more
polarized through unionization. Physicians desire similar benefits for
themselves and improved quality of care for their patients. Unions are
a mechanism to equalize the bargaining power between physicians who

Elizabeth Thompson Beckley, Strength hi Numbers: Employed Physicians Enlist
Bargaining Clout, MODERN PHYSICIAN, Feb. 26, 2001, available at
http://www.modernphysician.col/archive/article.php3'?refid= I 91 &phrase=strength+in+nurnb
ers (last visited Jan 12, 2003).
Unions for
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are constrained by reimbursement economics and insurance companies
that impose these restrictions.
WHY IS IT DIFFICULT TO UNIONIZE DOCTORS?
Doctors are in a fiduciary relationship with patients. As a result,
unionization appears to create a conflict of interest for the physician
between serving the patient's best interest or his own personal needs.
These conflicts are illustrated below in the concepts of autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, confidentiality, honesty and distributive
justice.
Autonomy
Some people say that where you have two physicians you get at least
three opinions. A more benign observation would be that physicians
are taught to consider several possible diagnoses and treatments and
then narrow these options via physical examination and laboratory
testing to reach a final diagnosis. This analytical thought process
expresses their autonomy as professionals but is at odds with managed
care efforts to save money by performing as few tests and procedures
as possible.
With the increasing prevalence of managed care,
physicians have fought the limitations that these systems place on
patient care. In accordance with their Hippocratic Oath, physicians
strive to deliver the best care and this is often the most expensive care.
By contrast, managed care seeks to deliver health care while
making a profit. As such, managed care more closely follows a
utilitarian approach. Physicians do not function in a vacuum of their
own autonomy, but rather, within a patient-physician relationship. This
relationship is much less likely to fit a utilitarian model than a Kantian
model. "According to Kant, things possess a 'market value' (their worth
consists precisely in the uses to which they can be put); but persons
alone possess dignity, or intrinsic worth, which cannot be reduced to a
market value. ' 3 In a Kantian model, the patient and physician share a
moral reciprocity and may struggle with each other to uphold
individual goals and dignity, meaning, their autonomy.
Unions may be a vehicle for physicians to reclaim the autonomy
that they have lost to managed care organizations and government
3 BARRY

R. FURROW

ET AL.,

BIOETHIcs:

Publ'g Co. 3rd ed. 1997) (emphasis added).
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regulations. As a means to an end of greater good for physicians, the
union appears more utilitarian. The very goal of individual physician
autonomy is likely to be subsumed, however, by the majority rules of
union policy. Before autonomy can be achieved through unionization,
physicians must first relinquish some individuality by virtue of being
union members. Physicians need to have colleague physicians as their
union spokespersons; otherwise, their ideals may be contorted as an
unintended means to an end. Thus, physician autonomy is lost to the
union coalition in the process of seeking autonomy.
Non-maleficence (Do No Harm)
The Hippocratic oath articulates an ethical cornerstone of physicians:
first, do no harm. It states: "I will follow that system of regimen which,
according to my ability and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my'4
patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous.
In seeking union representation, how will doctors avoid harming
patients? Any physician union would need to create safeguards for
patient care. One such safeguard is the policy of most physician unions
including the American Medical Association (AMA) sponsored union,
Physicians for Responsible Negotiation, of prohibiting strikes.5 The
no-strike policy is not mandated by statute but is voluntarily adopted by
physician unions for ethical reasons.
Traditional labor unions have successfully used strikes to
accomplish their goals. When other bargaining tools are exhausted,
striking may be the only way short of employee concessions to resolve
disputes. Airline pilots are an example of how contract disputes that
culminate in strikes can bring a business to its knees. If physician
unions are not permitted to strike then will their union be powerless?
No. It does mean, however, that doctors do not have a key bargaining
tool and will have to find other means including arbitration and
mediation to resolve differences.
In addition, federal or state legislation may be used to protect both
physicians and patients in the union setting. Texas, for example, was
the first state to pass legislation giving doctors anti-trust immunity for
specific joint negotiation activities with health care plans. 6

4 1d. at 27, quoting the Oath of Ilippocrates.

5Beckley, supra note 1,at 5.

6 1 Tex. Ins. Code § 29.06(a) (2002).
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Beneficence
The beneficent goals of medicine are intimately linked with those of
non-maleficence. As further stated in the Hippocratic Oath: "Into
whatever houses I enter, I will go into them for the benefit of the sick,
7
and will abstain from every voluntary act of mischief and corruption.'
Physician unions will have their greatest potential impact on third
parties: patients.
Physician unions are unique because the real
beneficiaries (or possible victims) may be patients, not memberdoctors. While aiming to protect doctors, these unions must also serve a
higher goal of improving patient care benefits. Physician unions have
the potential to negotiate appropriate lengths of hospital stay for
patients and to expand services covered by insurance. While these may
be pipe dreams, a potential for such beneficial changes exists.
Confidentiality
Maintaining patient confidentiality is key to the patient-doctor
relationship: "Whatever, in connection with my professional practice,
or not in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which
ought not to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that
'8
all such should be kept secret."
Managed care and electronic transmission of patient billing and
privileged information threaten patient confidentiality. Unions may
further erode patient confidentiality if patients' medical records are
revealed during the course of negotiation for increased patient benefits.
Additionally, patients' willingness to confide in their doctors may be
undermined by their perception of unions.
Although an absurd
caricature, the doctor as "God" may be easier to trust than the doctor as
9
a "Teamster."
Honesty
Physicians' honesty and integrity demand full disclosure of all pertinent
information to patients. This allows patients to be informed in their
decision making. In order to safeguard individual patients and protect
the public, physicians may need to disclose the existence of infectious
diseases or health hazards in the environment or workplace through
7 FURROW,

supra note 3, at 27.

Id.
Teamster is defined as a "driver of a team," or driver of a "motor truck for transporting

goods." J.B. Sykes,

THE OXFORD DICTIONARY

refer to truckers who are union members.

935 (6th ed. 1978). This term has been used to
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scientific publication or the media. In this circumstance, the physician
protects the privacy of his patients by not revealing their identities
while still informing potential patients or employers of health risks.
Unions could act as a shield to protect physicians who in good faith
have disclosed critical patient information and suffered dire
consequences.
Dr. David Kern was the founder and director of the Occupational
and Environmental Health Service and an employee of Memorial
Hospital of Rhode Island.10 He was also a tenured faculty member of
the Brown University School of Medicine."' In the course of teaching
medical students, in December 1994, he visited the Microfibres, Inc.
(Microfibers) factory where he was asked to evaluate a patient for a
specific lung condition.' During this visit, Dr. Kern and his industrial
hygienist signed a routine confidentiality agreement designed to protect
the company's trade secrets. 1 3 Dr. Kern determined that the patient did
not have the condition in question. 14 More than one year later, he
returned to the factory and discovered that one worker, in a cluster of
eight patients, was suffering from a potentially fatal lung condition
directly due to inhalation of nylon fibers.1 5 Later, he discovered that a
pathologically similar cluster had occurred in 1990-1991 at
Microfibres' Canadian factory. 6 Dr. Kern named the potentially fatal
lung disease "flock worker's lung." 17 He had no idea that an
international controversy would ensue over the next few years when he
attempted to properly warn his patients, their employers and the
scientific community of this serious condition. The company's quest to
protect profits instead of worker's health and to block the publication of
Dr. Kern's discovery, coupled with company ties to the university,
culminated in Dr. Kern losing his job and the Occupational and
Environmental Health Service being shut down.
In October 1997, Dr. Kern filed a complaint with the federal
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) alleging a
'0 David G. Kern, M.D., M.O.H., The Unexpected Result of an Investigation of an
Outbreak of OccupationalLung Disease, 4 J. OF OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVTL. HEALTH 19 (JanMar 1998).
Id.
2Id. at 20.
!3id.
14 d.
'5 Kern, supra note 10, at 20.
16Id. at 21.
17 id"
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violation of his Section 1 IC rights under the OSHA Act.' s Section 1 IC
prohibits discrimination against employees who assert their OSHA
rights. 19 Dr. Kern's wife, Robin Kern, who previously practiced labor
law, was the first attorney to articulate a legal theory defending l IC
rights for an employed physician. The Regional Director of OSHA
found merit in Dr. Kern's allegations against the company, the hospital
and the university, and referred his case to the U.S. Department of
Labor (DOL) in Boston that litigated such claims. In response to Dr.
Kern's letter appealing the dismissal of his complaint, he received a
letter in January of 1999 that OSHA in Washington, D.C. and the U.S.
DOL were requesting all files from their field office for a review of his
case. Dr. Kern has received no further communication from these two
agencies.
Dr. Kern is currently in private medical practice in Maine and has
been hailed by colleagues worldwide with awards for his courage in
placing his patient's care and disclosure of his scientific research for the
public welfare ahead of his career. In addition to OSHA, unions could
act to protect physicians like Dr. Kern as well as unwitting victims of
occupational hazards.
Distributive Justice
The principle of distributive justice means that benefits and burdens
should be distributed equitably between individuals or groups of
people. Resources should be apportioned fairly. People should act in a
way that third parties are equally benefited and burdened in order to
balance potential hardships such as limited resources.
In the current medical climate, physicians are being forced to take
more responsibilities each year without commensurate benefits. As the
costs of medical testing, procedures and business overhead continue to
increase, managed care organizations are steadily decreasing
reimbursements or refusing to pay at all for services rendered by
physicians and hospitals. Despite managed care organizations' denial
of reimbursements, physicians remain morally, legally and ethically
responsible to their patients. While physicians have always had the
looming specter of malpractice, physicians now must be liable as
gatekeepers for managed care organizations. With each advancing
year, managed care organizations further limit physicians in terms of:
8

Id. at 29.

19Id.
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(1) the number and type of tests and procedures utilized and (2) the
hospital and specialist services requested.
Courts, however, are increasingly unwilling to let managed care
escape the liability of bad patient outcomes created by refusing or
limiting health care services. In Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of
Illinois, Inc. (Petrovich), the Illinois Supreme Court found that the
defendant managed care plan and its independent contractor physicians
20
were negligent in failing to timely diagnose the patient's oral cancer.
In August of 1989, the plaintiff first sought the professional services of
Dr. Marie Kowalski, the primary care provider she had chosen from
Share's provider list.2 1 The plaintiffs employer had selected and
enrolled her in Share.2 2 Dr. Kowalski was employed by Illinois
Masonic Medical Center at a satellite facility that contracted with Share
to provide medical services. 23 In September of 1990, the plaintiff saw
Dr. Kowalski for persistent pain in the right sides of her mouth, tongue,
throat and face.24 Dr. Kowalski referred the plaintiff to Dr. Slavick and
Dr. Friedman who both contracted with Share.25
Despite Dr.
Friedman's recommendation of either a magnetic resonance image
(MRI) or computerized tomography (CT), Dr. Kowalski told the
plaintiff that Share would not allow any new tests. 26 Dr. Kowalski then
provided Dr. Friedman with an old MRI report. 27 The plaintiff sought
no redress from Share because she was not aware of Share's grievance
28
procedures.
On October 31, 1990, a new MRI was done per Dr. Kowalski's
order but failed to show the anatomical area of concern. 29 The plaintiff
testified that on November 19, 1990, Dr. Kowalski told her that this
MRI showed no abnormalities.
Due to the plaintiffs complaints of
20

See Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 719 N.E. 756 (111.1999) (defendant

managed care plan found negligent in failure to timely diagnose patient's oral cancer); Sloan v.
Metropolitan Health Council of Indianapolis Inc., 516 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. App. 1987) (HMO

could be found vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its employed doctors); Dunn v.
Praiss, 606 A.2d 862 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (employed physician was "controlled"

by the managed care organization, and thus, vicariously liable for his negligent acts).
2

d. at 761.

22 Id.
23 Id.

24 Petrovich, 719

N.E. at 761.

Id.
26 Id.
27id.
25

28

29

3

d.

Petrovich, 719 N.E. at 761.

' m. at 763.
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persistent pain, Dr. Kowalski referred her back to Dr. Friedman in
April or May of 1991. 3 1 Biopsies performed by Dr. Friedman in June
of 1991 revealed squamous cell cancer necessitating surgical removal
of the base of the plaintiffs tongue and portions of her palate,32pharynx
and jaw bone as well as radiation treatment and rehabilitation.
The court in Petrovich used the two-step analysis of apparent
authority that emerged from Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital
(Gilbert) in 1993. 33 Gilbert was the first Illinois case to apply the
doctrine of apparent authority to medical malpractice and held that "a
hospital can be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a
physician providing care at that hospital, regardless of whether the
physician is an independent contractor, unless the patients knows, or
34
should have known, that the physician is an independent contractor."
The first step of the Gilbert test requires the plaintiff to demonstrate
that there was a "holding out," meaning that "the HMO, or its agent,
acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that
the physician who was alleged to be negligent was an agent or
employee of the HMO. 3 5 The second step requires the plaintiff to
show that he acted in "justifiable reliance" on the hospital or HMO
agent-physician's conduct "consistent with ordinary care and
prudence. 3 6 The Petrovich court extended the analysis of hospitals in
Gilbert and its predecessor cases to contracts between physicians and
HMOs. The plaintiffs estate in Petrovich settled for $1,232,000 in
October of 2001.
Unions may be a means by which physicians could balance the
scales of distributive justice so that physicians, hospitals, managed care
organizations and other health care entities are jointly responsible to
patients and regulatory bodies. Of course, unions have no influence
over case law. Unions could help avoid litigation by promoting
conditions that are more equitable for patients and doctors.
31 id.
32
13

id.
Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital, 156 Ill. 2d. 511, 524 (1993).

Apparent

authority implies that conduct of the principal and/or the agent would lead a third party to
reasonably believe that an agency relationship exists. Agency is a fiduciary relationship
created by express or implied contract or by law in which one party (the agent) may act on
behalf of another party (the principal) and bind that principal party by words and actions. See
TtE OXFOR-D
DICTIONARY 23, 52.
3
4

5

id.

d. at 525.

36 id.
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CAN ANY PHYSICIAN JOIN A UNION?

The National Labor Relations Act specifies the persons and rules that
govern collective bargaining in the United States. 37 The National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is the federal agency charged with
administering and enforcing the NLRA. The key to the Act is Section
7 which endows employees with the "right to self-organization, to
form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
and protection..." 38 Collective bargaining refers to a group of
employees called "bargaining units" who share a "community of
interest," meaning similar skills and abilities, coming together to voice
a concerted opinion. 39 Employees also have the right not to join the
40
union as stated by "the right to refrain from any or all such activities."
Under Section 8 of the NLRA, employees are given protection from
both the employer and the union.
Section 2(3) of the NLRA specifically excludes supervisors and
independent contractors from collective bargaining. 4' The reason that
supervisors are excluded from NLRA protection is that they are part of
management, and therefore, are aligned with the employer from whom
employees are seeking protection. Independent contractors work for
themselves, and thus, have no employer. Only physicians employed by
hospitals or health care systems who are not statutorily defined as
"supervisors" are eligible to join a union. These exclusions are
particularly troublesome in the health care setting where it is not always
clear who is characterized as a "supervisor" as opposed to an
"employee." As a result, the main dispute in many labor law cases is
whether the employees in question are supervisors.
The NLRA was drafted in the 1930s and amended in the 1950s,
when only two to 3% of the workforce were "professionals." The
NLRA's intent was to balance the inequality between employers and
employees. This became a governmental concern because of the
37 The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 15 1-69. The NLRA governs the
State laws regulate teachers in local school districts and

federal and private sector.

municipalities.
38 1(.
39 m.

40 Id.
41id.
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resulting burdens and effects on the flow of commerce and the
economy that could be created by problems with the production of
goods or services. Laws that permit organization and collective
bargaining safeguard commerce by protecting employees making goods
and providing services. This is accomplished by: (1) removing certain
recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest and (2) encouraging
more amicable resolutions of disputes pertaining to wages, hours and
working conditions. The NLRA aims to eliminate employee-caused
obstacles to free flowing commerce by: (1) encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and (2) protecting the
employees' rights to full freedom of association and self-organization
via unions that designate representatives. The purpose of unions,
therefore, is to help negotiate the terms and conditions of employment,
mutual aid and protection of its members.
The NLRA was conceived in the context of factory work and
could not have anticipated a world of Internet workers and high-tech
medicine. Those first to organize in academia were the Yeshiva
University faculty members who unsuccessfully argued that they were
not supervisors, and therefore, could not be excluded from
unionization. 42 The NLRB successfully reasoned that faculty authority
was "exercised in the faculty's own interest
rather than in the interest of
43
the university " who was their employer.
Controversies surrounding the health care industry and
unionization were partly resolved by regulations and case law. In 1989,
the NLRB final regulations held that the appropriate bargaining units in
acute care hospitals were limited to: (1) all physicians, (2) all registered
nurses, (3) all professionals except for registered nurses and physicians,
(4) all technical employees, (5) all skilled maintenance employees, (6)
all business office clerical employees, (7) all guards and (8) all nonprofessional employees except for technical employees, skilled
maintenance employees, business office clerical employees and
guards.44 American HospitalAssociation v. NLRB held that the Board's
limitation to eight (and only eight) specified bargaining units was not
facially invalid.45

42 Yeshiva

University v. NLRB, 444 U.S. 672, 685. The NLRA governs the federal and

private sectors. State laws regulate teachers at local school districts and municipalities.
43 Id.

44 29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (2002).
45 Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, Ill S.Ct. 1539 (1991).
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The majority of American physicians, approximately 325,000, are
As such, Section 2(3) of the NLRA
independent contractors.
specifically excludes these physicians from the rights and protections
provided to employees via unionization. In 1999, this was tested by
physicians from Cape May and Atlanta Counties in New Jersey whom
the Philadelphia regional NLRB found to be independent contractors,
and therefore, not eligible to form a collective bargaining unit.4 6 The
physicians argued that they were defacto employees because they were
essentially dominated by the health care plan. This argument did not
work because most independent contractor physicians were providers
for several managed care plans; therefore, no single plan could be
expected to dominate them.
CAN HOSPITAL HOUSE STAFF JOIN A UNION?
After completing medical school, physicians begin a course of training
called a residency that lasts at least three years and upwards of eight
After
years. The first year of residency is called "internship."
residency, physicians may continue specialized training in fellowships.
Interns, residents and fellows are collectively referred to as "house
staff' because their duties usually require overnight stays "in-house,"
meaning in the hospital.47 The teaching of house staff is called
graduate medical education. Attending physicians, by contrast, have
completed all of their training, are licensed to practice medicine and
often teach the house staff.
In 1974, Congress extended the NLRB's jurisdiction to nonprofit
health care facilities. In 1976, the Cedars-Sinai case held that house
staff members were "students" not employees, and thus, not eligible to
join a union because they did not fit into one of the eight recognized
bargaining units defined by the NLRA. 4 8 The majority reasoned that
the primary purpose of house staff was to engage in graduate medical
education. 49 "They [house staff] participate in these [graduate medical
education] programs not for the purpose of earning a living; instead
they are there to pursue the graduate medical education that is a
46

1999).

AmeriHealth Inc./AmeriHcalth HMO, Case 4-RC 19260 (Reg'l. Dir. Dec. May 24,

47Some fellowships are completed under the guise of a private practice; therefore, these

individuals would not be considered house staff
41Cedars-Sinai Hosp. Med. Ctr., 223 NLRB 251 (Mar. 23, 1976).
49 Id. at 253.
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requirement for the practice of medicine." 50 The NLRB found that
graduate medical education programs did not exist to meet hospital's
staffing requirement, but rather, provided an arena "allow[ing] the
student to develop, in a hospital setting, the clinical judgment and
proficiency in clinical skills necessary to the practice of medicine in the
area of his choice."51 The NLRB considered house staff remuneration
to be a "stipend," not a salary, because it was a flat fee not determined
by the nature or number of services rendered or the numbers of hours
worked.52 The NLRB quoted the Essentials of an Approved Internship
and the Essentials of an Approved Residency manuals that were
prepared by the Council on Medical Education and approved by the
American Medical Association and used as guidelines for graduate
medical education programs. 53
These manuals characterized
remuneration as a "scholarship for graduate study." 54 . Furthermore,
house staff members were not eligible
for Cedars-Sinai retirement, a
' 55
fringe benefit given to "employees."
The dissent in Cedars-Sinai found these arguments
unpersuasive. 5 6 NLRB Member Fanning used the Essentials to support
his position citing the mandate approved by the AMA House of
Delegates in January of 1975 and distributed to all approved teaching
hospitals.57 The Guidelines for Housestaff Contracts or Agreements
state that hospital graduate medical education programs must "provide
fair and equitable conditions of employment for all those performing the
duties of interns, residents and fellows... 58. Other guidelines from the
Essentials manuals described appropriate salaries, hours of work, offduty activities, vacations, leave, insurance benefits, professional
liability insurance and disciplinary procedures. Member Fanning
stated: "I do not see how my colleagues can ignore such compelling
evidence that the ultimate authoritygoverning house staff relationships

50 Id.
51id.
52 Id. at 252.

53Cedars-SinaiHosp. Med. Ctr., 223 NLRB at 252.
54id.
55id.
56
Id. at 254.

" Id. at 256.

58 Cedars-Sinai Hosp. Med. Ctr., 223 NLRB at 257. See, Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, S. 794, S. 2292, 93rd
Cong. (Ist Sess. 1975) [hereinafter Hearings].
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and programs [the Council on Graduate Medical Education]
so clearly
59
considers these individuals [house staff] to be employees."
The Cedars-Sinai dissent also found support in the legislative
history and language of the NLRA. Section 2(12) created a special
definition of a "professional employee," thus, permitting such
individuals to unionize. 60 Section 2(12)(a) directly addresses house
staff as "any employee engaged in work ... requiring knowledge of an
advanced type in afield of science or learning customarily acquired by
a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in
an institution of higher learning or a hospital... ."1 The House
Conference Report accompanying the Taft-Hartley amendment to the
NLRA specifically includes house staff in the group of "such persons
as legal, engineering, scientific62 medical personnel together with their
junior professionalassistants."
Finally, the dissent looked to the respondeat superior doctrine. In
the common law master-servant relationship, masters may be held
vicariously liable for the actions of servants who function as their
agents. Likewise, hospitals and institutions
can be held vicariously
63
liable for the actions of their house staff.
In November of 1999, the NLRB specifically overruled CedarsSinai and decisions following it in Boston Medical Center stating that
"while they [house staff] may be students learning their chosen medical
craft, [they were] also 'employees' within the meaning of Section 2(3)
of the Act [NLRA]. "64 Boston City Hospital (BCH) is a public sector
hospital and part of the Boston Medical Center. BCH had a house staff
collective bargaining unit organized in 1969 which had negotiated
approximately ten collective bargaining agreements with BCH by
1970.'
In 1996, the Boston City Council required that the merger
between BCH and University Hospital recognize the petitioner (House
Officers' Association/Committee of Interns and Residents) as the
collective bargaining representative of the 280 BCH house staff
members. 66 This petition resulted from the October 1997 decision by
'9Cedars-SinaiHosp. Med. Ctr., 223 NLRB at 257.
60 m.

" Id.(emphasis added).
62 Id

at 258 (emphasis added).

61Id,at 255.

Boston Med. Cntr. Corp. and House Officers' Ass'n/Comm. of Interns and Residents,
330 NLRB 152 (1999).
14'

65 Id. at 152-53.
66 id.
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the NLRB Regional Director dismissing
the petition seeking
67
certification for a unit of house staff.
The NLRB in Boston Medical Center listed several reasons why
house staff members, although seeking educational credentials, were
employees under Section 2(3) of the NLRA.
First, house staff
members work for a statutorily-defined "employer" as specified by
68
Section 2(2) of the NLRA.
Second, house staff members receive
compensation for their services in the form of a stipend from which
federal and state income tax and social security is withheld. 69 Their
fringe benefits include workers' compensation, paid vacations and sick
leave, parental and bereavement leave, coverage for health, dental, life
and malpractice insurance.7 0 Third, the house staff provide patient care
for the hospital as "junior professional associates" analogous to
traditional apprentices. 71 Fourth, house staff members are unlike
typical students because they do not: (1) pay tuition or student fees, (2)
take conventional examinations for grades that decide advancement or
remediation, (3) register in a typical manner or (4) seek a diploma.7 2 In
reviewing prior graduate student cases, the NLRB found that "...there
73
[had] been no question that students [were] statutory employees.
In answer to fears of house staff employees infringing on the
constitutional autonomy of employers and undermining the educational
process, the majority in Boston Medical Center cited two state supreme
court cases. In Regents of the University of Michigan, the court found
that due to the "unique nature" of the University of Michigan, the
breadth of collective bargaining "may be limited" if the issue was
"clearly within the educational sphere. 7 4 Likewise, in The Regents of
the University of California, the court found that the "doomsday cries"
by the university that house staff would undermine education were
"premature. ' 75 The dissent in The Regents of the University of
Californiaby Justice Brames and other alarmists overlooked the ethical
67

6

Id. at 152.

8 Id.at 162.

69Boston Med. Cntr. Corp., 330 NLRB at 162.
70 Id.
71Id.
72 id.
73 Id.

74 Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Eemployment Relations Comm 'n, 204 N.W.2d 218,

224 (Mich. 1973).
75The Regents of the University of California v. Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 715
P.2d 590, 604 (Cal. 1986).

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 6:83

obligations of physicians and their obvious priority to learn instead of
undermine the education they seek at tremendous personal and
financial sacrifice.
Boston Medical Center stands for the proposition that house staff
can be both students and employees. Reversal of Cedars-Sinai is
probably the result of the new Democratic NLRB that appeared to favor
a broader interpretation of the NLRA. Clearly, this holding can be
extended to graduate students in nearly all disciplines and petitions to
the NLRB are now proceeding.
RECENT CASE LAW AND THE FUTURE OF PHYSICIAN
UNIONS
The future of physician unionization has been dealt a lethal legal blow
with two recent Supreme Court cases defining "supervising" nurses. In
May 2001, NLRB v. Kentucky River was decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court with the majority opinion appearing to broaden, and perhaps
cloud, the definition of supervisors.7 6 The Court held that "independent
judgment" was "indisputably ambiguous and it was settled law that the
NLRB's interpretation of ambiguous language in the NLRA was
entitled to deference."7 7 Furthermore, "professional employees by
definition engage in work 'involving the consistent exercise of
discretion and judgment.' 78 If such judgment "makes one a supervisor
under §152(11), then Congress's intent to include professionals in the
NLRA will be frustrated because 'many professional employees (such
as lawyers, doctors, and nurses) customarily give judgment-based
direction to the less-skilled employees with whom they work."' 79 The
Court found ambiguity in the NLRA statutory language: "there may be
some tension between with Act's exclusion of [supervisory and]
managerial employees and its inclusion of professionals but we find no
authority for 'suggesting that that tension can be resolved' by distorting
the statutory language in the manner proposed by the Board."8
"Perhaps the Board could offer a limiting interpretation of the
supervisory function of responsible direction by distinguishing
employees who direct the manner of others' performance of discrete
76 Nat '1Labor Relations Bd. v. Kentucky River Cnity. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001).
77Kentucky River, 532 U.S. at 725.
78id.

79Id. at 720 (emphasis added).
80 Id.
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tasks from employees who direct other employees as §152(11)
requires." 81 These Court conclusions appear to place attending
physicians in the role of "supervisors," thus, excluding employed and
independent contracting attending physicians from union eligibility. It
remains to be determined by the circuit courts whether or not house
staff can maintain the collective bargaining status that they have
benefited from for the past few decades.
What Is the Status of House Staff Unionization in Chicago?
In November 2000, the NLRB Region 13 decided against Advocate
Health and Hospital Corporation (Advocate) in a petition initiated by
the Physicians for Responsible Negotiation (PRN) on behalf of
Lutheran General Hospital house staff who wanted an election to vote
whether to be represented by PRN for purposes of collective
bargaining. 82 The Petitioner, PRN, is a labor organization created on
November 21, 1999 by signing a constitution and creating by-laws.
Formation of PRN was facilitated by a loan from the AMA. "The
stated purpose of the PRN is to be a labor organization that will
promote the art and science of medicine, the betterment of public health
and the integrity of the doctor patient relationship through collective
bargaining." 83 Practicing physicians of medicine and osteopathy and
house staff in accredited programs are eligible to join PRN.84 A
national nine-member board with three locally employed officers
operates PRN.85
The NLRB reached several conclusions in the Advocate case.
First, PRN is a labor organization under the NLRA and is not
disqualified from representing Advocate employees in collective
bargaining. 86 Second, the NLRB upheld Boston Medical Center in
87
finding that house staff members were employees under the NLRA.
Third, chief residents (those most senior in training) are not
"supervisors" under the NLRA, and therefore, are not excluded from
collective bargaining.88 Fourth, Advocate is not a "joint employer" of
81 Id.

82 Advocate Health and Hosp. Corp. D/B/A Lutheran General Hosp. (Advocate) and
Physiciansfor Responsible Negotiation, (PRN), (Petitioner), Case 13-RC-20426 (2000).
" Id. at 3.
84id.
85 Id.
86
1Id. at 10.

87Physiciansfor Responsible Negotiation, Case 13-RC-20426 at 10.
" Id. at 11.
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the rotating residents defined as house staff of other Chicago area
hospitals who spend one or more months training at Lutheran General;
therefore, rotating residents are properly excluded from the petitioned
for unit.8 9 Finally, attending physicians were employed by Advocate
while house staff were employed by Lutheran General Hospital;
therefore, attending physicians and house staff could not be placed in
the same collective bargaining unit because they had different
90
employers.
Advocate appealed to the full NLRB panel in Washington, D.C.
which dismissed their argument that house staff were mere students
ineligible for collective bargaining but agreed to further review the
questions of: (1) whether certain chief residents were "supervisors" and
(2) whether rotating house staff should be included in the unit. After
the United States Supreme Court issued the decision in Kentucky River,
the NLRB remanded the Advocate case for further review on theses two
issues. In November 2001, the NLRB reaffirmed its previous holding
that the appropriate unit for collective bargaining includes house staff
and chief residents but excludes rotating house staff. Advocate's
request for a full NRLB panel hearing is pending.
Why Might House Staff and Attending Physicians Not Fit Into the
Same Bargaining Unit?
In the Advocate case, attending physicians and house staff do not have
a common employer as required for inclusion in the same collective
bargaining unit. 9 1 Advocate attending physicians do not have a
"community of interest" with the house staff meaning that attending
physicians' goals and priorities appear to be different from those of
house staff.
For example, house staff may desire better on-call
sleeping quarters, free cafeteria meals or additional didactic lectures.
These issues are not germane to the attending physicians because they
do not take part in the house staff training program. Some house staff
demands (such as additional lectures) may in fact impose upon the
attending physicians who would be asked to provide additional
teaching services. Furthermore, Advocate attending physicians are

89
90

Id. at 12.
Id. at 15.

91Physiciansfor Responsible Negotiation, Case 13-RC-20426 at 15.
92 Id.
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contractually in a "different hierarchy" given their higher salary,
93
different method of payment and their roles as teachers of house staff.
The NLRB indicated that contracts between the employed house
staff and attending physicians were essentially different. It may be a
fundamental obstacle to union formation if attending physicians and
house staff do not fit into the same bargaining unit. The NLRB
currently allows eight, and only eight, recognized collective bargaining
units. "All physicians" are placed in one group. Does this mean that
petitions need to be made to the NLRB to expand the number of units?
What other options exist for employed attending physicians to express
statutorily given rights to unionize?
What Is the Status of Employed Attending Physician Unionization
In The United States?
In July of 2000, PRN filed a formal petition requesting a union election
for occupational health physicians employed by Occupational Health
Centers of New Jersey and Concentra Managed Care, Inc.
(Concentra). 94 Concentra operates the nation's largest network of
occupational health centers with 350 physicians in more than 200
centers in thirty-two states. 95 In August of 2000, the Regional NLRB
determined that Concentra physicians were not supervisors and ordered
elections. 96 In September 2000, the full panel of the NLRB in
Washington, D.C. granted review. In June of 2001, the full NLRB
remanded to the Regional NLRB in Newark, New Jersey to consider
the facts again under the Kentucky River standard to: (1) determine
whether Concentra physicians "assign and responsibly direct" other
employees and (2) define the degree of "independent judgment" used to
exercise this authority. 97 In January of 2002, the Regional NLRB
determined that Concentra physicians were not supervisors. 98 In
October of 2002, the full NLRB granted Concentra's request to review
this regional decision. 99 Both parties must file briefs to the full NLRB
by the end of November 2002.100
93 id.

94 See www.4prn.concentra/index.html.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97

id.

98 Id.

99 See www.4prn.concentra/index.html.
100 Id.
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What Does the Future Hold for Independent Contractor
Physicians?
The majority of doctors in the United States are independent
contractors, and therefore, not eligible to join unions. Section 2(3) of
the NLRA specifically excludes independent contractors from joining
unions. The NLRA was created to protect employees from
unscrupulous employers. Independent contractors, by definition, do not
have employers because they work for themselves. In the medical
setting,
emergency room
medicine physicians, pathologists,
anesthesiologists and radiologists are specialists that often form groups
to independently contract with hospitals or managed care organizations.
From whom or what would independent contractor physicians need
protection?
In the current medical climate, physicians want to reclaim their
autonomy and be protected from intrusive policies of managed care and
government regulations which often limit how, where, for how long
and in what manner they may care for patients. If unions are not an
option for independent contractor physicians then they must appeal to
legislatures to change laws. Given the propensity for ever-increasing
government regulation and the millions of dollars annually re-cooped
by qui tam (or "whistle blower") investigations, this is not a realistic
option.10 The Department of Justice (DOJ) reports that qui tam actions
filed by private citizens are the fastest growing source of health care
fraud cases. 10 2 In 1998, the DOJ reported that qui tam suits increased
1527% between 1987 and 1997, with recoveries of $355,000 in 1987
sky-rocketing to $625 million by 1997.103 Nearly half of all money
recovered in health care fraud cases is the result of qui tam suits.
Independent contractor physicians can form large groups in order
to obtain more desirable contracts with managed care organizations.
While there is strength in numbers, considerable obstacles exist. The
quest for individual autonomy means that doctors traditionally have a
very difficult time getting together and agreeing on anything. Larger
'o'
"Qui tam" is taken from the Latin expression "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se
ipso inhac parte sequitur" meaning "he who brings the action for the king as well as for
himself." Erickson v.American Institute ofBio. Sciences, 716 F.Supp. 908, 909 at n.1 (E.D. Va.
1989). See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THIE LAW OF ENGLAND, BOOK Ill,
160

(1768).
0'5 BNA Health L. Rep. 1502 (Oct. 4, 1996).

103 On

file with author, Professor James Dechene, DePaul Health Care Reimbursement

and Delivery Systems Course, classnotes, Fall 2000. See also U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Publications and Documents, at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc.html.
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numbers of doctors needed to effectuate change may create schisms
within the coalition, particularly if different medical specialties are put
together. Finally, physicians may be accused of violating anti-trust
laws through monopoly formation.
How Do Anti-trust Laws Affect Collective Bargaining?
The Sherman Act Section 1 prohibits all contracts, combinations and
conspiracies in unreasonable restraint of trade. 10 4 Price fixing amongst
competitors is a per se violation of the Sherman Act." °5 The U.S.
Supreme Court in Arizona v. Maricopa Medical Society first held that
independent contractor physicians were prohibited from fixing prices
and from collectively negotiating with managed care plans under the
Sherman Act. 10 6 As a result, physicians in the United States are
prohibited from collectively negotiating unless there is substantial
financial or clinical integration amongst them. 10 7 Anti-trust laws will
be discussed for: (1) exclusive versus non-exclusive network structures,
(2) financially integrated networks, (3) clinically integrated networks
and (4) messenger model structures.
Exclusive Versus Non-Exclusive Networks
Protection from anti-trust violations exists for certain physician joint
venture structures if specific criteria are met. These joint venture
structures can exist in exclusive or non-exclusive networks of
physicians. An exclusive network is only open to a select panel of
physicians who additionally must meet criteria and credentialing
established by the network. 1 8 An exclusive network is protected from
anti-trust challenges when it: (1) includes less than 20% of doctors in
any specialty with active hospital privileges in a relevant geographic
market and (2) all member-physicians share substantial financial
risk. 1°9 One physician may be included in the network on a nonexclusive basis if his specialty has less than five physicians." 0 A nonexclusive network is open to all hospital-affiliated physicians who wish
to join and who are approved by the credentialing committee. A non104The

Sherman Anti-trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2002).

105id.

Arizona v. Maricopa Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
See U.S. Dept. of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm'n Statements of Anti-trust
Enforcement Policy in Health Care, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13 at 151.
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exclusive network is not challenged by anti-trust regulation when it (1)
consists of less than 30% of physicians in any specialty with active
hospital privileges in the relevant geographic market and (2) all
member-physicians share substantial financial risk in the network.,
One physician in a non-exclusive network can be included if his
specialty has less than four doctors. 1 2 Outside these proscribed safety
zones, networks will be evaluated under the rule of reason looking for
adequate integration of physician services producing significant
efficiency.
Financially Integrated Networks
Physicians can avoid per se anti-trust violations if their networks are
either financially or clinically integrated.

Financial integration of

networks means that all participating doctors share in the financial risk
of the network, and therefore, can avoid per se illegal price fixing
allegations. The four main forms of payment in financially integrated
contracts, (3)
networks are: (1) capitation, (2) percent of premium
13
rates.'
case
global
(4)
and
fee-for-service
discounted
Capitation means that each physician receives a predetermined
fixed payment per patient over a specified period of time that is
intended to cover all services needed for those patients. Each patient
office visit, therapeutic intervention, or referral to another physician
essentially deducts money from the pool of cash already received by
the doctor. Even the conscientious physician can lose money if his
patients are so sick that he exhausts the monies allotted to him.
Capitation is arguably a conflict of interest. The fewer patients seen,
tests ordered and operations performed, the more money the doctor
makes. The utilitarian premise of managed care is cloaked in the more
important corporate goal of making a profit. The profit motives of
managed care organizations create temptations to physicians including
increased income and year-end bonuses received from profitable
networks. This often means that patients receive less care, not more
efficient care.
physician's
each
link
contracts
Percentage-of-premium
compensation to the financial performance of all physicians in the
network. If as a group physicians act in a manner to create more profit,
111Id.
"12
See, supra note 107.
' Id. at 153.
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then each physician makes more money. This logically creates
resentment toward those physicians performing more services and
having sicker patients because these physicians result in the group
losing money. In a Darwinian fashion, there is motivation to exclude
from the network less "fit" physicians who cost the network profits.
While capitation encourages each physician to look out for himself,
percentage of premium contracts may result in some physicians
"ganging up" on other network physicians who want to or have to do
more for their patients.
Discounted fee-for-service is a third means of payment for
physicians in financially integrated networks. This model usually
involves a withheld pool of reimbursement that can be distributed to
participating physicians if the network makes money by year's end. If
the network does not meet its financial goals then the physician only
gets the initial discounted fee-for-service with no payments from the
withheld pool which then reverts to the payer. Having already received
a predetermined fee, the physician's only incentive may be to pursue a
year-end bonus from the pool. This payment method appears,
therefore, to create fewer conflicts of interest for physicians. There is
also less incentive to withhold care because the physician is paid
(though at a discounted rate) for each patient seen. Utilitarians may
argue that fee-for-service in any form encourages physicians to see
patients more frequently and render unnecessary services. Utilitarians
would likely find that the lack of year-end bonus is not a strong enough
disincentive for physicians to regulate their dispensation of services.
A fourth type of network uses global fee payments. A single
global fee is paid per patient for an entire course of treatment no matter
how long the patient stays in the hospital or how many tests or
operations are needed. Patients, however, differ greatly in their
responses to treatments. Simplistic global patient fees assume, for
example, that diagnosis X always requires A, B, and C tests and 5 days
in the hospital. These estimates of patient care needs and lengths of
hospital stay are often very inaccurate and can grossly underestimate
true costs. In its best inception, this model encourages physicians of
different specialties to work together with greater communication, thus,
avoiding duplicating tests and treatments. Physicians may need to
relinquish some individual autonomy for the better integrated care of
the patient. The obvious pitfall is that all physicians treating the patient
will lose financially if their patient requires more services than are
covered by the global fees. As a result, there is an incentive for
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physicians to discharge patients sooner and perhaps perform fewer
tests. Patients may be discharged "quicker and sicker."
These and other evolving networks allow independent contractor
physicians to join forces and negotiate for more desirable contracts
with managed care. Networks may enhance physician autonomy by
using contracts as tools for better fees and increasing covered patient
services and lengths of hospital stay.
The reality, however, is that managed care organizations currently
dictate prices despite the large numbers of physicians in networks.
This has reached the point that managed care organizations frequently
deny all payments for procedures and tests they deem "not medically
necessary" (a term poorly defined).
Additionally, hospital-based
networks may negotiate packages with several managed care
organizations and contractually bind participating physicians to some
undesirable plans. The "options" for physicians faced by undesirable
managed care contracts are to not join the network or to withdraw in
ensuing years when contract terms become unsatisfactory. Physicians
must be very careful in contracting because they may bind themselves
for longer terms than anticipated. Of greater concern is that nonparticipating physicians in geographic regions heavily controlled by
managed care are unable to make a living because they have no access
to patients!
Clinically Integrated Networks
Even without financial integration, networks may avoid anti-trust
violations via clinical integration. No black letter guidelines exist to
define clinical integration. DOJ Policy Statements, however, indicate
114
that networks are clinically integrated if they satisfy two elements.
Networks must have active and continuing programs to: (1) assess and
modify practice patterns of participating doctors and (2) promote a high
level of cooperation and interdependence amongst physicians to
provide quality care and control costs.' 15
Physicians in clinically integrated networks may have greater
contracting leverage with managed care organizations but at the
expense of professional autonomy. Networks may eliminate physicians
who they feel are inefficient by virtue of longer than average
hospitalization or higher than average use of diagnostic testing or
1141d
115id.
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surgical intervention. Networks do not consider that some physicians
have sicker patients needing longer hospital stays and more tests.
Utilization Review personnel look to tables showing how long a
"typical" patient with the same diagnosis is likely to stay in the
hospital. 16 Patients do not necessarily "read the tables" of expected
lengths of hospital stays or treatment outcomes. Physicians are bound
by their ethical code to provide the most comprehensive care even if
they (and the hospital) are not paid. Efficient care is the goal of these
networks. This, however, may not be the best care.
Messenger Models
In contrast to financially and clinically integrated models, nonintegrated "messenger models" minimize but do not escape the risk of
anti-trust price-fixing liability. The messenger model uses an agent or
third party "messenger" to convey information from physicians to
payers regarding contract issues and payment terms. Messenger
models do not allow collective bargaining with payers.
Even modified forms of the messenger model have violated antitrust laws. The DOJ filed suit against a union of orthopedic surgeons
for organizing a boycott and price-fixing conspiracy against Blue Cross
of Delaware. 117 The DOJ prevailed in its claim that the union and
member-physicians misused the messenger model to create an illegal
cartel. 118

Similarly, in Florida, a consent decree was entered against a
Florida physicians' union and its consulting firm who acted as the
network's messenger in illegal price-fixing and boycotting.119 The joint
venture lacked sufficient financial and clinical integration. 120 The DOJ
alleged that network surgeons performed 87% of the general and
vascular surgeries at five Tampa hospitals.121 The DOJ alleged that the
messenger did not merely transmit information between the physicians

116Utilization

Review is the process hospitals and health care facilities employ to check

the appropriate lengths of hospital stays and patient treatment.

This process is typically

performed by nursing, medical or other personnel who review patients' medical charts after
hospitalization.
'7 United States v. Fed'n of Physicians and Dentists, Inc., No. 98-475 (Del. 1998).
118
Id.
119United States v. Fede'n of Certified Surgeons and Specialists, Inc. and Pershing

Yoakley & Assoc., No. 99-167-CIV-T-17F (M. D. Fla. 1999).
120id.
121 Id.
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and the health plans.1 22 Instead, the network's consultant tried to
negotiate higher fees and informed payers that network surgeons would
terminate their contracts unless the payers contracted with all surgeons
participating in the network.1 23 Under the consent decree, the network
was prohibited from involvement in any collective contracting
efforts. 124 The network's consultant was enjoined from acting as a
messenger for the network or any other competing
physician group
25
comprised of more than 20% of its members. 1
These models and any others do not operate in a vacuum.
Hospitals also need to make money to stay in business. Hospital and
managed care utilization review officers are constantly assessing the
"need" for patient admissions and putting pressure on physicians to
discharge their patients.
CONCLUSION
Currently, only hospital-based house staff physicians and employed
attending physicians who are not "supervisors" can join a union. These
attending physicians may need to petition the NLRB for formation of
an additional category for acute care hospital employees if they do not
share a community of interest with a house staff union. Alternatively,
attending physicians may petition the legislature for expanded NLRB
jurisdiction to cover all health care-providing institutions.
The majority of American physicians are independent contractors
and cannot unionize. These physicians want to level the playing field
stacked against them by managed care organizations, hospitals and
ever-increasing government regulation. Independent physicians need
to form coalitions similar to unions, yet with patient care as the ethical
ideal as exemplified by a policy of no strikes or boycotts. The
traditional union model permitting strikes is not an option in medicine,
neither legally nor morally. Upholding patient ethics and quality care
means that doctors must create a new union form with the voices of
physicians and patients both being heard. This could be accomplished
with union board membership including patient representation to draft
and periodically review union practices.
Union by-laws must
incorporate safety measures to assure quality patient care which
122 Id.
123
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remains a higher priority than physician income. At the same. time,
physicians should not be expected to provide free health care simply
because managed care organizations want to make a profit. In order to
avoid anti-trust violations, such unions need lawyers experienced in
labor law and health care law who understand patient needs. The
MD/JD of the future is likely to be the best person to effectuate these
changes. Additionally, the new physician union could be a forum to
promote women and minorities in medicine who remain
underrepresented and underpaid as physicians.
Physicians-in-training continue to have case law in favor of their
unionization even after Kentucky River and, hopefully, will retain union
status. After decades of concern for patient safety and house staff
welfare, fifteen countries in the European Union voted in 1999 to
decrease the length of the work week for house staff to 48 hours by
2012.126 Despite some similar efforts in New York, many house staff
members commonly work up to 72 or more hours without relief. The
longest consecutive hours worked are typically in the surgical training
programs where top physical and mental performance of physicians is
critical to proper patient care. Without house staff unions, these
physicians must appeal to their chairperson or the Residency Review
Committee which grants accreditation and considers grievances in
graduate medical programs.
Unions are not a panacea for what ails America's financiallychallenged health care system which is overrun with managed care
organizations seeking profit over quality patient care. Unions are one
mechanism to balance the overwhelming power of managed care
organizations compared to increasingly regulated and constrained
physicians. Bills in Congress initially as the Campbell Bill and
reintroduced in a revised form this year as the Barr-Conyers Bill
proposed simulated test groups of physicians, not in a union model,
who would contract with managed care organizations but be exempt
from the NLRA. The goal was to study this new prototype but the bill
fell victim to elections which frequently oust politicians supporting
these measures. As a result, the Barr-Conyers Bill was never heard in
the House of Representatives. The lack of progress toward physician
unionization should not make physicians abandon their efforts.

126 Paul R. McGinn, Europe Wiil Limit Resident Work Hours, AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS
No. 35, at 40 (Sept. 20, 1999).
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The vast majority of physicians' complaints and efforts to unionize
stem directly from problems generated by managed care organizations
which have imposed themselves between the patient and physician and
sought to ration care and services in the quest for profit. Creating
universal health care coverage for all people in the United States would
eliminate this unnecessary "middleman" in the guise of managed care
organizations and could provide additional money for patient care and
research.

